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Introduction
Many scientists today consider climate change as the biggest threat humanity has ever faced. It will lead to severe disruptions of everyday life around the globe and it is an extremely difficult problem to tackle. The difficulties arise primarily for two reasons. First, climate change is due to strong negative external effects of economic activity (in particular energy production and transportation) which prevent its solution by market mechanisms.
1 Second, climate change is an inherently global phenomenon that can only be addressed on a global basis. To be effective, measures against climate change have to be implemented on a broad international scale, which requires difficult and protracted negotiations between many heterogeneous countries with very diverse goals; see, e.g., Barrett (2003) or Nordhaus (2013) . In the past, such negotiations often had limited success or failed altogether. In the present paper we take these proposals as a starting point and assess the desirability of delegating climate policy to a supranational authority. We develop a simple theoretical model of a world consisting of a large number of countries, which derive utility from energy consumption but suffer both from the pollution caused by emission of greenhouse gases (smog, black carbon, etc.) as well as from the external effects caused by climate change. Climate policy is delegated to an SEA with the power to directly impose emission limits on the countries of the world; we thus abstract from potential difficulties concerning the implementation of policies via appropriate instruments. Rather, we focus on the incentives and dynamic behavior of the authority.
3
Our first finding is that, even if all countries respect the SEA's policy prescriptions and the SEA 1 Stern (2007, p. 1) refers to climate change as "the greatest example of market failure we have ever seen".
2 Barrett (1994) argues that international environmental agreements need to be self-enforcing and, therefore, they are not likely to be signed by many countries unless the global benefits of cooperation are small. 3 Note that an alternative interpretation of our model is that of an environmental protection agency (EPA) which has the power to impose emission standards on firms on a national level. Due to the global nature of climate change, however, we prefer the to think of the authority as a supranational one.
has global welfare as its mandate, the authority faces a serious commitment problem; the optimal policy of a benevolent SEA is in general dynamically inconsistent. Discretionary behavior of the authority causes under-investment in clean technologies, over-pollution and, accordingly, a welfare loss relative to the situation when it has commitment power. We demonstrate that the dynamic inconsistency problem can be ameliorated by giving the SEA a mandate that differs from the maximization of global welfare. In particular, an SEA that attaches more weight to the local costs of emissions (stemming from smog, polluted water, black carbon, etc.) than the individual countries themselves but less or even zero weight to the damage caused by the global stock of greenhouse gases, can implement a discretionary policy with significantly smaller welfare losses than a benevolent SEA. This seemingly counter-intuitive result obtains because an authority with these preferences provides stronger incentives for the individual countries to invest in clean technologies. However, we also show that the optimal mandate of the authority depends on the initial level of global pollution: the higher is the stock of greenhouse gases, the more weight should be given to the local cost of emissions. This creates another dynamic inconsistency problem, this time on the side of the individual countries: even if they can commit to set up an SEA and to respect its policy prescriptions, they have a recurrent incentive to change the authority's mandate as the stock of greenhouse gases accumulates.
Our framework is a modification of the model used by Harstad (2012) and Harstad (2016) , which was developed to analyze international environmental agreements. 4 We depart from this framework along three dimensions. First, as the purpose of our analysis is to study optimal delegation of climate policy, emission levels are not decided and negotiated by individual countries but imposed by a supranational environmental authority. Second, we describe the world as consisting of many small countries rather than a finite number of (large) countries. This rules out any strategic interaction between countries and allows us to focus more clearly on the properties of the supranational authority's optimal policy problem. Finally, unlike Harstad (2012, 2016), we assume that there are local costs of greenhouse gas emissions. This assumption serves the technical purpose of guaranteeing existence of an equilibrium in an environment with infinitesimally small countries and, at the same time, makes the policy problem arguably more realistic. Many economic activities that generate greenhouse gases such as CO 2 typically also lead to other emissions that have short-lived but local effects, e.g., methane, hydrofluorocarbons, sulphur, or black carbon (soot). 5 The policy prescription of our analysis is that endowing the SEA with a mandate that gives high weight to these local costs helps the authority to curb CO 2 emissions and their negative global consequences. In addition to that, it is known that restricting the short-lived greenhouse gas emissions would have noticeable direct effects on climate change; see, e.g., The Economist (2015ab).
This paper contributes to a large literature on dynamic inconsistency and coordination of environmental policy. Gersbach and Glazer (1999) however, use a modelling framework that is very different from the one in the present paper, and they do not discuss the question of optimal delegation at all.
Optimal delegation is addressed extensively in the literature on monetary policy, where dynamic inconsistency problems can be extenuated by augmenting the central bank's mandate by strong inflation aversion, as in Rogoff (1985) , or by a desire for policy inertia, as in Woodford (2003) . In a general context, it has recently been analyzed in Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Amador and 5 CO 2 itself has no negative effects at the location where it is emitted but it stays in the atmosphere for very long and causes global warming (the global cost).
Bagwell (2013), and Krähmer and Kováč (2016), among others. To the best of our knowledge, the so far only formal application of optimal delegation in environmental policy is provided by Helm et al. (2004) . These authors study emission taxation of firms in a very simple, essentially static model and find that delegation to an "environmentalist policy maker" is beneficial to the society. The environmentalist policy maker attaches higher weight than the society to the disutility from pollution. Due to its simple structure, however, the model in Helm et al. (2004) does not capture the stock externality of greenhouse gas emissions at all, nor does it distinguish between local and global costs. The present paper, in contrast, analyzes the design of an SEA in a fully dynamic framework featuring the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the resulting negative stock externality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic and ecological environment. Section 3 studies two extreme benchmarks: business as usual (BAU) and the firstbest solution.
6 Section 4 analyzes delegation of emission decisions to an SEA which pursues the goal of maximizing aggregate welfare in the world, while section 5 analyzes the optimal delegation problem. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are presented in the appendix at the end of the paper. Finally, an online appendix analyzes in greater detail the dynamic inconsistency problem of the countries that results from the state-dependence of the optimal mandate given to the SEA.
The economic environment
We consider a world consisting of a unit interval of infinitesimally small countries i ∈ [0, 1].
Energy can be produced either by a clean technology or by a dirty one. Only the latter generates greenhouse gas emissions. We denote by R i,t the stock of clean technology available in country i at time t and by g i,t the amount of emissions generated by this country in period t. We choose units of measurement in such a way that R i,t + g i,t denotes the total amount of energy available to country i in period t. Furthermore, we denote by r i,t country i's investment in the clean 6 BAU describes the situation in which all individual countries pursue their own interests without any coordination among them. The first-best solution is the allocation that would be implemented by a social planner who makes all investment and emission decisions for all countries and seeks to maximize aggregate welfare in the world. technology in period t. This implies that
where 1 − ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the rate of depreciation of the technology stock. An initial value R i,−1 is exogenously given for every country i ∈ [0, 1].
The total stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at time t is denoted by G t . It is assumed that
where 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1) is the natural decay rate of greenhouse gases. The initial stock G −1 is exogenously given.
The utility derived by country i during period t is measured by
where B(R i,t + g i,t ) is the benefit derived from energy consumption, C(g i,t ) measures the cost of (local) emissions generated by country i, D(G t ) denotes the cost generated by the (global) stock of greenhouse gases, and k is the constant unit cost of investment. Note that all countries have the same utility function but that the countries can differ from each other with respect to their initial technology levels. We assume that B : R → R is concave and smooth, that C : R → R and D : R → R are strictly convex and smooth, and that k is a positive constant.
Denoting the common time-preference factor of all countries by β ∈ (0, 1), we can write total discounted welfare derived by country i as
and aggregate world-welfare as
The setup described above is very similar to that used by Harstad (2012 Harstad ( , 2016 . In particular, we use an additively separable utility function and a linear investment cost function, which ensures high analytical tractability. However, there are also important differences. In particular, we assume a continuum of countries and these countries face costs of local emissions (described by the function C). Contrary to the framework studied by Harstad (2012 Harstad ( , 2016 ), in our model there is no strategic interaction between the countries because each one is infinitesimally small. If the global cost of climate change were the only negative consequence of emissions, all countries would like to increase their emissions and, consequently, their benefits from energy consumption without bound, because the global cost of climate change is a purely external effect. The local costs of emitting greenhouse gases serves as a limiting factor to energy production and thereby ensures that an equilibrium exists. Finally, note that from section 4 onwards, we will introduce a supranational environmental authority, which is also absent from Harstad (2012 Harstad ( , 2016 ).
Benchmarks
In this section we describe two benchmarks that will be useful for assessing the value of commitment and delegation in the main part of the paper. The first benchmark describes business as usual, a situation in which all countries pursue their own interests and there is no coordination among them whatsoever. For the second benchmark we assume that there exists a social planner who chooses allocations in such a way that aggregate welfare is maximized. These two benchmarks correspond to no internalisation of the environmental externality and to full internalisation, respectively.
Business as usual
Suppose that all countries act separately in their own interest. The countries do neither coordinate their actions nor is there any institution that facilitates such a coordination. Since every country is infinitesimally small, it disregards its influence on the global stock of greenhouse gases. In other words, it neglects (2) and treats the stocks of greenhouse gases (G t )
as exogenous to its own decision problem. We refer to the resulting equilibrium as business as usual (BAU-equilibrium).
Definition 1 A BAU-equilibrium consists of a global sequence (G t ) +∞ t=0 and individual sequences {(R i,t , g i,t , r i,t ) +∞ t=0 | i ∈ [0, 1]} such that the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) Given (G t ) +∞ t=0 it holds for all i ∈ [0, 1] that (R i,t , g i,t , r i,t ) +∞ t=0 maximizes (3) subject to (1) .
(ii) Equation (2) holds for all t ≥ 0.
Lemma 1
The unique BAU-equilibrium is given by
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t ≥ 0, where g BAU and R BAU are determined by
All formal proofs are relegated to the appendix. The above lemma shows that in the BAUequilibrium all countries, irrespective of their initial technology levels, choose the same emission rates and technology stocks from period t = 0 onwards. The global stock of greenhouse gases evolves according to equation (7), which implies that it converges to the steady state G BAU determined by
First-best solution
Now suppose that a social planner makes the investment and emission decisions for all countries in order to maximize world welfare as given by (4) . We call the resulting solution the first-best solution.
Definition 2 The first-best solution consists of a global sequence (G t )
Lemma 2 The first-best solution is characterized by equations (1)- (2) along with the first-order
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t ≥ 0 as well as the transversality condition
Comparing the first-best solution with the BAU-equilibrium, we see that total energy con-
by every country i ∈ [0, 1] and in any given period t ≥ 0 is the same in both solutions. The only difference in the two solutions consists therefore in the way how this amount of energy is produced. In the BAU-equilibrium the technology level R BAU is installed in period 0 and maintained forever, whereas in the first-best solution the sequences (g i,t )
and (R i,t ) +∞ t=0 are not constant. Their evolution together with that of (G t ) +∞ t=0 is determined by equations (2) and (11)- (13) . The stock of greenhouse gases converges to G FB defined by
Comparing this equation to (8) and using strict convexity of C and D it follows that G FB is smaller than G BAU . This implies of course that the steady state emission rate g FB in the firstbest solution is smaller than g BAU and, consequently, that the steady state technology stock R FB in the first-best solution must be larger than R BAU . To summarize, full internalisation of the external effects of greenhouse gas emission does not change the benefit from energy consumption for any country but it speeds up the replacement of the dirty technology by the clean one.
The linear-quadratic case
Throughout the paper we will illustrate our results by considering a version of the model in which the benefit and cost functions are given by
where c and d are positive parameters and z is a bliss point for energy consumption. These functional forms are borrowed from Harstad (2016) , except for C(g) which is absent in his analysis. The quadratic specifications allow us to compute the two benchmark solutions easily.
For example, the steady state values in the BAU-equilibrium are given by
whereas the corresponding values in the first-best solution are
As has been mentioned before, it holds that G FB < G BAU and R BAU < R FB .
Example 1 Assume the functional forms stated in (14) with the following parameters: k = 1, z = 1, β = 0.96, ρ = 0.9, γ = 0.9, c = 1, and d = 0.1. Under these assumptions, the steady state in the BAU-equilibrium is given by G BAU = 1.36 and R BAU = 0.728, whereas the steady state in the first-best solution is G FB = 0.1628 and R FB = 0.8477.
Delegation to a benevolent authority
In this section we turn to the main investigation of this paper by introducing a supranational environmental authority (SEA), to which all countries i ∈ [0, 1] delegate their decisions on the emission levels (g i,t ) +∞ t=0 . The countries keep control over their investments (r i,t ) +∞ t=0 and seek to maximize their individual welfare given in (3) . We distinguish between the case where the SEA has commitment power so that it can announce and implement the entire family of sequences
} at the outset of period 0, and the case where it lacks such commitment power. In both cases we assume that the SEA is benevolent in the sense that it seeks to maximize aggregate welfare as given in (4). 
Commitment
In this subsection we assume that the SEA has commitment power and announces the emission levels for all countries and all periods at the outset of period 0. The countries act as followers.
We start by determining the best response of an arbitrary country i ∈ [0, 1] to the fixed family
Using the above characterization of best responses, we can define an equilibrium under commitment. Our first main result demonstrates that such an equilibrium coincides with the first-best solution.
Definition 3 An equilibrium under commitment consists of a global sequence (G t ) (2), and (15).
Theorem 1 An equilibrium under commitment coincides with the first-best solution.
The above result follows from the observation that in the case where the authority commits to any family of sequences of emissions {(g j,t ) +∞ t=0 | j ∈ [0, 1]}, the countries choose corresponding 7 We shall drop the assumption of benevolence in section 5. efficient investment levels. This is reflected by the coincidence of equations (11) and (15).
On a more intuitive level, one can say that the negative external effect operates solely via the emissions and the resulting stock of greenhouse gases and, hence, by setting the emission levels at the socially optimal values, the first-best solution can be achieved. The problem with this solution, however, is that it is not dynamically consistent. By announcing low emission levels for the future, the SEA provides the correct incentives for the countries to invest into clean technologies. But once these technologies are implemented, the authority itself faces an incentive to allow higher emission levels in order to provide more energy consumption to the countries. If the SEA lacks full commitment power, it will therefore not want to stick to its announced policy. We now turn to the analysis of this case.
Discretion
Consider the situation where the SEA cannot make a binding commitment. To formalize this idea, we assume that the authority makes a consistent plan in the sense of Strotz (1955 Strotz ( -1956 ).
8
This means that the SEA consists of an infinite sequence of selves, one for each period. In every period t the current self of the SEA decides on {g i,t | i ∈ [0, 1]} only. But in doing this, it correctly anticipates how its choice of the emission rates affects the investment behavior of the individual countries and the future emission levels determined by later selves of the authority.
Formally, the different selves of the authority play a game among each other. We solve this game for a stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
9
A stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium can be defined most easily in recursive form using recursive notation. Consider any given period t. Variables dated t will be written without a subscript, e.g., G, R i , g i , and r i . Variables of the preceding period t − 1 will be denoted by the subscript − , e.g., G − , R i,− , g i,− , and r i,− . At the start of a given period the aggregate states G − andR − = {R i,− | i ∈ [0, 1]} are known to all countries and to the SEA, whereR − is interpreted as the distribution of technology levels. 10 As for the timing, we follow Harstad (2012) and assume that every time period is split into two stages. In the first stage all countries invest into clean technologies (investment stage) and in the second stage the authority sets the emission levels and the countries consume (emission stage). Note that the emission stage begins once the investment costs are sunk and that the SEA knows the countries' technology stocks at the end of the investment stage,R = {R i | i ∈ [0, 1]}, when it has to decide on the emission levels
We restrict attention to those stationary Markovian strategies g of the SEA according to which the authority's choice of the emission level for country i depends only on the aggregate state variables G − andR as well as on country i's own technology stock R i . We write such a strategy in the form g i = g(G − ,R, R i ).
11
Before we can define an equilibrium under discretion, we need to explain some preliminary considerations. To begin with, we need to find out how the countries react to a given strategy g of the SEA. Suppose therefore that all selves of the SEA play the strategy g. It follows from (2) that the stock of greenhouse gases evolves according to
where
Now suppose that we are at the beginning of period t and consider an arbitrary country i that has technology stock R i,t−1 . Since country i is infinitesimally small, it takes (G s ) +∞ s=t−1 and
10 By referring to these variables as 'aggregate states' we indicate that no individual country can affect them by unilateral actions. In particular, country i can decide on its own technology level R i , but it cannot alter the entire distributionR. It will turn out that the equilibrium strategies are independent of the distributionR − and that the equilibrium value functions depend onR − only via the aggregate (or, equivalently, the average) technology level 1 0 R i,− di; see lemma 4 below. 11 In general, stationary Markovian strategies would be of the form g i = g(G − ,R, i). An example of a strategy that is ruled out in our analysis is g i = aG − + bR i/2 , where a and b are constants. In this example, the emission of country i depends explicitly on the stock of technology available in country j = i/2.
(R s ) +∞ s=t−1 as given and maximizes
s=t . This is equivalent to setting R i,t = R(G t−1 ,R t ), where
We proceed under the assumption that the maximization problem in (18) so that the distributionR is degenerate. This feature is due to the linear investment cost. The distributionR can of course depend on G − and we therefore writẽ
By definition, the mapping R must satisfy
We assume that R(G − ) is the unique fixed point of equation (20), which is indeed true in the linear-quadratic case. Equations (16) and (19) together form the law of motion of the aggregate states G andR corresponding to the given strategy g. One can combine these two equations to obtain
This shows that the dynamics of the greenhouse gas stock can be separated from the accumulation of technology.
Now that we have determined the reaction of the countries to a fixed strategy g and have described the induced dynamics of the aggregate state variables, we can evaluate the strategy g according to the SEA's welfare measure. Let us denote by V (G − ,R − ) the value of the strategy g for a self of the authority that takes over control in a situation when the aggregate states are
given by G − andR − . The value function must satisfy the recursive equation 
subject to (2) . Dropping terms that do not depend on the emission levels and using (2) to eliminate G, it follows that the mapping i → g i = g(G − ,R, R i ) maximizes the functional
We are finally ready to define an equilibrium under discretion.
Definition 4 An equilibrium under discretion consists of functions (g, R, G, G 0 , R, V ) such that conditions (17)- (18), (20) , and (22)- (23) hold and such that, for all G − and allR, the
It is easy to verify that the first-best solution does not qualify as an equilibrium under discretion, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The first-best solution cannot be implemented as an equilibrium under discretion.
The separability and linearity assumptions made in section 2 imply a number of useful properties of an equilibrium under discretion which we state in the following lemma. To this end, we denote byR − the average technology stock of the distributionR − , that is,R − = 1 0
Lemma 4 (a) The authority's equilibrium value function V is of the form
(b) The equilibrium strategy g is of the form
(c) The function R is of the form
(d) The functions V 0 , g 0 , and R 0 from parts (a)-(c) satisfy
and
for all G − and all R i .
An interesting property of the equilibrium emission strategy g 0 is that its sensitivity with respect to the technology level R i is independent of how the stock of greenhouse gases affects country i's utility (i.e., it is independent of the form of the cost function D) whereas it does depend on how the local emissions by country i impact its own welfare (i.e., it depends on the form of the cost function C). This observation, which will become relevant in section 5 below, is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Suppose that the strategy g 0 is differentiable. Then it holds that ∂g 0 (G − , R i )/(∂R i ) ∈ (−1, 0) and that this partial derivative is independent of the form of the function D.
The linear-quadratic case
In this subsection we determine an equilibrium under discretion in the linear-quadratic environment introduced in section 3.3.
Theorem 3 Consider the linear-quadratic specification from section 3.3. There exists an equilibrium under discretion in which the policy functions take the forms
The coefficients h 1 , h G , and h R are given by
In this equilibrium, the stock of greenhouse gases converges monotonically to
The equilibrium described in the above theorem has a number of interesting properties that we would like to point out. First of all, all countries choose the technology stock R BAU in period 0 and maintain that stock forever. This shows that, if the SEA lacks commitment power, it is unable to induce the countries to invest more than in the BAU-equilibrium. As can be seen from the proof of the theorem, this property is due to the fact that the equilibrium strategy g 0 of the authority has the reaction coefficient h R = −1/(1 + c) as stated in (30). This, in turn, has the consequence that the countries play the constant investment strategy R 0 described in (27) . Given that in equilibrium the countries' investments are not responsive to any changes in the stock of greenhouse gases, the SEA can improve welfare only by curtailing emission rates relative to business as usual. As shown in the theorem, this results in the long-run stock of greenhouse gases to be equal to G DIS stated in (33). It is easy to see that
holds whenever d is strictly positive. 
Delegation to a non-benevolent authority
The delegation of emission control to an SEA can improve aggregate welfare relative to business as usual because the authority can internalize the external spillover effects of greenhouse gas emissions. However, as we have seen in theorem 3, the authority cannot accelerate the conversion from fossil fuel based-energy production to emission free technologies if it lacks commitment power. As will be shown in the present section, the dynamic inconsistency problem at the root of this result can be mitigated by endowing the SEA with an objective functional that differs from aggregate welfare (4). The idea of optimal delegation is borrowed from the literature on monetary policy, where dynamic inconsistency problems can be extenuated by augmenting the central bank's mandate by strong inflation aversion, as in Rogoff (1985) , or by a desire for policy inertia, as in Woodford (2003).
Equilibrium definition
Let us for example assume that the objective functional of the SEA is of the form
and whereĈ andD are strictly convex cost functions that may be different from the functions C and D describing the preferences of the countries. Of course, one could consider much more general mandates for the authority but the proposed form will be sufficient to make our point.
We are particularly interested in the question of whether the SEA should attach more weight to the cost of local emissions g i,t or to the cost of the global stock of greenhouse gases G t .
An equilibrium under discretion in this situation can be defined along the same lines as in the previous section. The only difference to the previous arguments is that one needs to take into account that the SEA evaluates its policy using the functionsĈ andD. Analogously to section 4.2 we can therefore obtain the following equilibrium conditions.
15
Definition 5 An equilibrium under discretion consists of functions (g 0 , R 0 , G, G 0 , R,V 0 ) such that the following conditions hold:
Note that the functionV defined byV (G − ,R − ) =V 0 (G − ) + kρR − is the equilibrium value function of the authority. Aggregate welfare according to (4) is given by
kρR − , where V 0 solves the recursive equation
We would like to find out how the SEA's cost functionsĈ andD must be chosen so that aggregate welfare is improved relative to the equilibrium under a benevolent SEA. In the following subsection, we derive a few analytical results for the linear-quadratic example from section 3.3.
The linear-quadratic case
We consider the same specifications as introduced in section 3.3 and assume furthermore that
15 Note, in particular, that a result analogous to lemma 4 holds also in the present situation.
whereĉ andd are positive parameters.
On first thought, one may think that the value ofĉ is of subordinate importance but that the authority should be given a high value ofd. After all, the external effect operates via the global stock of greenhouse gases, and it is tempting to suggest that this stock must be highly penalized. The following analysis, however, proves that this conjecture is wrong and shows that the parameterĉ of the cost of local emissions plays the key role.
We start by deriving an equilibrium under discretion in the case whereĉ = c holds and wherê d is an arbitrary positive number.
Lemma 6 Assume thatĉ = c andd > 0. There exists an equilibrium under discretion in which the functions g 0 andV 0 have the forms
and in which (27) holds. The coefficientsĥ 1 ,ĥ G ,ĥ R ,v 1 ,v G , andv GG are described by the same formulas as the corresponding coefficients h 1 , h G , h R , v 1 , v G , and v GG in theorem 3 except that the parameter d is replaced byd wherever it appears. The stock of greenhouse gases converges monotonically toĜ
It will be convenient to refer to the pair (ĉ,d) as the type of the SEA. The benevolent authority, for example, is of type (c, d). The following theorem demonstrates that it is not possible to reduce the welfare loss caused by discretionary behavior by variations ofd alone (i.e., by keepinĝ c equal to c).
Theorem 4 Letd > 0 be arbitrarily given. Aggregate welfare in the discretionary equilibrium with a non-benevolent SEA of type (c,d) is smaller than or equal to aggregate welfare in the discretionary equilibrium with a benevolent SEA of type (c, d) (which is described in theorem 3).
The intuitive explanation for this result is that it is not the externality per se that causes the discretionary equilibrium to have poor welfare, but the dynamic inconsistency. The dynamic inconsistency, in turn, can only be mitigated by changing the incentives for the countries to invest in green technologies. As we have seen in lemma 5, these incentives are independent of the cost function D (orD, respectively) but do depend on C (orĈ, respectively). What, then, is the role of the parameterd in the present example? It is obvious from equation (43) that by varyingd between 0 and +∞ one can generate any steady state greenhouse gas stock between 0 and
For example, by choosingd = (1 + c)d/c > d one obtains the first-best steady state G FB . One could also try to find that value ofd which maximizes per-period welfare in steady state. To this end, recall from lemma 6 that independently of the value ofd it holds in the discretionary equilibrium for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t ≥ 0 that R i,t = R BAU . Furthermore, in steady state we must have g i,t = (1 − γ)G. When one maximizes per-period welfare across those steady states for which R i,t = R BAU holds, one must therefore choose G in such a way that
is maximized. One might call this a restricted Golden Rule, where the word 'restricted' indicates that R i,t = R BAU is imposed. Solving the first-order condition for this problem yields
,
To summarize, by fixing the value ofĉ at c and varying the cost parameterd only, one can steer the stock of greenhouse gases towards its first-best steady state or other desirable values (like the restricted Golden Rule stock) but one cannot achieve higher welfare than the benevolent SEA would implement. We must therefore also consider variations of the cost parameter for local emissionsĉ. Whereas the general procedure to compute the equilibrium remains the same as in lemma 6, the algebra becomes more cumbersome. In particular, it is no longer the case that (27) holds. We therefore relegate the relevant formulas to the appendix and proceed with an illustrative example.
Example 3 Assume the same parameters as in example 1. Under this assumption, the optimal type of the discretionary SEA, i.e., the pair of parameters ( Surprisingly, optimal delegation under discretion requires the authority to place a large weight on local emission costs and zero weight on the global costs of climate change. While this result may seem counter-intuitive at first, the underlying mechanism is readily seen. Preferences that put a large weight on local pollution costs endow the SEA with an incentive to punish countries that underinvest in green technologies, which in turn alleviates the SEA's time inconsistency problem. A large weight on local pollution costs, in turn, makes it optimal to put relatively little weight on global pollution costs in order not to distort the optimal trade-off between green and dirty energy consumption too much. Delegation of emission policies to an 'optimally designed' discretionary SEA eliminates almost the entire welfare loss resulting from lack of commitment, as is visualized in figure 2 . Example 4 illustrates that the optimal type of the SEA (i.e., the optimal choice of preference parametersĉ andd) in our model depends on the initial state (G − , R − ). For any given state, the optimal preference parameters are given by Figure 3 displays the optimal type as a function of G − , while holding R − constant. It shows that when G − is not too large, the optimal choice is to setĉ > c andd = 0, in line with our discussion of example 3. If, however, the initial stock of greenhouse gases is very large relative to the steady state, then it is optimal to put a positive weight on the global costs of climate change,d > 0.
The above finding points to a further complication of the optimal specification of an SEA's mandate. If the countries establish an SEA with optimal type (ĉ,d) at time 0, when the stock of greenhouse gases is equal to G −1 , they will face an incentive to revise this mandate when the greenhouse gas concentration changes in the course of time. One can think of two possible ways to approach this situation. One possibility is to allow for state-dependent mandates, that 
Concluding remarks
Dynamic inconsistency is ubiquitous in economic policy, and environmental policy is no exception. In the present paper we have pointed out that such a problem would also occur if a supranational environmental authority were established in order to control the emission of greenhouse gases in a world consisting of many individual countries. We have used a very simple and stylized, yet fully dynamic model to make our point. The main result is that the welfare loss that results from lack of commitment power can be kept very small by endowing the authority with a mandate to heavily penalize the local costs of emissions and to attach only little weight to the cost of the resulting (global) climate change. However, assigning such a mandate to the authority is again dynamically inconsistent, as countries face a recurrent incentive to modify the authority's mandate over time. Our overall conclusion is therefore that we caution agianst the foundation of an SEA with full decision power over emission limits.
Appendix Proof of lemma 1
Consider an arbitrary country i ∈ [0, 1]. Since this country takes (G t ) +∞ t=0 as given, one can drop the additively separated terms −β t D(G t ) from its objective functional (3) and it follows from (1) that country i maximizes
with respect to (R i,t , g i,t ) +∞ t=0 . Obviously, this is the case if and only if
holds for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t ≥ 0. Since the latter condition does neither explicitly depend on the country index i nor on time t, we obtain (5)- (6) . Finally, by combining (2) and (5) one obtains (7).
Proof of lemma 2
Using (1) we can rewrite (4) as
This expression is maximized with respect to the variables R i,t for all i ∈ [0, 1] and all t ≥ 0 if and only if
It follows therefore that the family of sequences {(g i,t ) +∞ t=0 | i ∈ [0, 1]} has to be chosen so as to maximize
subject to (2) . Since the emission rates g i,t enter the constraint (2) only via the integral 1 0
and since the cost function C is strictly convex, it follows that for every fixed t ≥ 0 all countries' emission levels g i,t must be equal. Denoting the common value by g t it follows from (46) that (9)- (11) hold. The Lagrangian function of the optimization problem is therefore
where λ t denotes the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint (2) . Writing down the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions plus transversality condition and eliminating the Lagrange multipliers from these conditions yields (12)- (13) .
Proof of lemma 3
Given (G t ) +∞ t=0 and {(g j,t ) +∞ t=0 | j ∈ [0, 1]}, the maximization of (3) with respect to (R i,t ) +∞ t=0 is equivalent to the maximization of
with respect to (R i,t ) +∞ t=0 . Obviously, the latter expression is maximized if and only if (15) is satisfied.
Proof of theorem 1
Condition (15) coincides with condition (46). Using the same arguments as in the proof of lemma 2 it can be seen that the authority's optimization problem is equivalent to the maximization of (47) subject to (2) . Since this is the same problem that a social planner would solve, the proof of the theorem is complete.
Proof of theorem 2
The first-order condition associated with problem (18) requires that in any equilibrium under discretion it holds for all i ∈ [0, 1] that
Now suppose that the first-best solution is an equilibrium under discretion. Combining the above condition with (11) one obtains
We claim that this cannot be the case. Suppose first that ∂g(G − ,R, R i )/R i = 0. In this case, the authority's equilibrium policy would assign the same emission level to all countries independent of their technology level R i , that is, there would exist a g such that the optimal solution of problem (23) g j dj = g. As a matter of fact, this condition is
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint. Obviously, this equation cannot hold for all i ∈ [0, 1] if there exist countries with different technology levels.
Now assume that B (R
is satisfied along the first-best equilibrium path. Then it follows from equations (11)- (12) that D (G t ) = 0 holds along this path, which cannot be true as D is a strictly convex function. This completes the proof.
Proof of lemma 4
The result in (a) follows immediately from equation (23) . Using the result from part (a), the result in (b) follows easily from equation (23) and the result in (c) follows from (18) and (20) .
Due to the results in (a) and (b), equation (23) simplifies to (24) . A necessary and sufficient first-order condition for the maximization of (23) with respect to once more and combining it with (17), (19) , and (22) we obtain (25) .
Proof of lemma 5
Differentiating equation (25) with respect to R i it follows that
.
Since B is concave and C is strictly convex, the above formula proves the first claim. Since the above formula does not involve the function D, the second claim holds as well.
Proof of theorem 3
Due to the linear-quadratic structure of the problem, we guess that the equilibrium strategy g is linear and that the equilibrium value function V is quadratic in G − . According to lemma 4 this means that (26) and
must hold, where h 1 , h G , h R , v 1 , v G , and v GG are undetermined coefficients. Solving equation
which proves (30). Using (30) it is straightforward to solve (18) and we obtain
which proves (27) . Condition (20) implies that the function R is constant as well. Its constant value is the degenerate distribution with
for all i ∈ [0, 1]. From (17) and (26) we obtain
and from (22) and (50) it follows therefore that
Substituting this into (49) and equating the coefficients of the powers of G − on both sides yields two linear equations for h 1 and h G . These equations have a solution if and only if
If (52) holds, the unique solution is given by (28)-(29).
It remains to determine the coefficients v 1 , v G , and v GG . To this end, we evaluate (24). Using the above results, this equation can be written as
Equating the coefficients of G − on both sides of equation (53) and replacing h 1 and h G by the values from (28)-(29) one obtains (32). Equating the coefficients of G 2 − on both sides of (53) yields
Substituting for h G from (29) and noting (52), it follows that This quadratic equation has one negative and one positive root. Since the equilibrium value function must be concave, we consider only the negative root, which is given by (31). Since v GG is negative, condition (52) is trivially satisfied.
Next, we compute the steady state values G DIS , R DIS , and g DIS that correspond to the above equilibrium. We already know that R DIS = R BAU . Using the fact that R 0 is a constant function and that ∂g 0 (G − , R i )/(∂G − ) = h G and ∂G 0 (G − )/(∂G − ) = h G + γ, it follows from (24) by differentiating and evaluating at the steady state that
Furthermore, evaluation of (25) at the steady state leads to Finally, it has to be shown that the greenhouse gas stock converges monotonically to G DIS .
Because of (21) and (51) it is sufficient to verify that 0 < h G + γ < 1 holds. Using (29) we obtain h G + γ = γ(1 + c) 1 + c + d − βv GG .
It follows immediately from this expression, from γ < 1, and from v GG < 0 that 0 < h G + γ < 1 is satisfied. This completes the proof of the theorem. 
2βγ(1 + c) .
One can show that the smaller one of these two eigenvalues coincides with h G + γ where h G is specified in (29). We also know from the proof of theorem 3 that this value is an element of the interval (0, 1). Hence, it follows that the optimal state trajectory of the optimization problem under consideration satisfies
Since this difference equation coincides with the aggregate law of motion G t = G 0 (G t−1 ) from theorem 3, the proof of the present theorem is complete.
Formulas for the caseĉ = c
Consider the example from subsection 5.2 withĉ = c. Equation (39) implies that 
Combining (36), (37), (55), and (56) it follows that Combining these two results with (56) and (57) we can express R 0 (G − ), g 0 (G − , R 0 (G − )), and G 0 (G − ) in terms of the variable G − and the undetermined coefficientsv G andv GG . If we substitute these expressions into equation (38) and compare the coefficients of equal powers of G − on both sides of the equation, we obtain three non-linear equations for the coefficientsv 1 , v G , andv GG . Once we have solved these equations, we have determined an equilibrium under discretion, i.e., the authority's policy function g 0 and value functionV 0 . One can then solve equation (40) to determine aggregate welfare in this equilibrium.
